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I. INTRODUCTION
The Review Conference in Vienna' has failed to adopt a revised
Convention due to unbridgeable differences among delegations on a
strengthened Protocol II of the Convention (Land Mine Protocol). Almost
all important provisions of the Protocol were contentious and a number of
delegations showed very limited room to move toward a compromise.
They were particularly, and surprisingly, the technical issues of
detectability, self-destructing, and self-deactivating mechanisms where no
consensus could be reached despite four preparatory meetings of technical
experts. Also, the issues of transfer and verification are far from being
resolved.
From a humanitarian viewpoint the conference was a
disappointment.
Discussions were very much focused on military
necessities and economic considerations while the humanitarian dimension
was only highlighted in interventions by the participating relief
organizations. The prospects for the adoption of a meaningful Convention
when the Conference resumes its deliberations in January and April 1996
are limited. It is likely that delegations will reach agreement only at a very
low common denominator, making the revised Land Mine Protocol the
same toothless tool as its predecessor.
As to the substantive work of the Conference on a revised Protocol
II, different positions emerged on the following provisions of the envisaged
Convention.
II.

SCOPE OF APPLICATION

There was general agreement among delegations that the material
scope of application of the revised convention should extend to internal
conflicts. Disagreement remained, however, as to the formulation of such
provisions. A large number of delegations supported a clear extension to
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"all circumstances including times of peace," while other wanted to link
the extension to the Geneva Conventions excluding "internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and
other acts of a similar nature."
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES
The concept of the revised Convention as it was laid out in the
Chairman's Rolling Text is based on a general distinction between
self-destructing and non-self-destructing mines.
The rational of this
concept is drawn from the belief of particular states from the western
group that self-destructing mines are a realistic solution to the current land
mine problem. It was put forward by delegations that these do not pose a
humanitarian problem for civilian populations as they would destroy
themselves within a short time period with a reasonable rate of reliability.
Based on this principle, the Conference tried to reach agreement
on the following provisions that would restrict the use of land mines:
1. General restrictions for all mines repeating principles
of customary humanitarian law, derived from the 1949
Geneva Conventions.
2. Restrictions on the use of non-self-destructing (dumb)
mines, requesting mine-laying parties to mark, fence,
maintain, monitor, and subsequently clear minefields, with
exemptions in the case of direct enemy contact.
3. Prohibition of remotely delivered mines that are not
self-destructing.
4. Prohibition of mines that are not detectable.
5. Prohibition of booby-traps.
It was in this area of practical provisions where differences of
positions remained that the President of the Conference referred to as
being "unbridgeable."
IV. SELF-DESTRUCTING MECHANISM
The Chairman's Rolling Text included a bracketed provision that
required mines to self-destruct within 7-90 days with a reliability of 99.9%
and a self-deactivating mechanism as a backup feature rendering the mine
inoperable within 30-365 days with the same reliability.
The discussions in the Committee surrounded two basic areas.
The first area was the time frame for self-destruct. Proposals ranged from
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7 days, 14 days, 30 days supported by the majority of delegations up to as
much as 365 days. The second area of discussion was the failure rate. A
number of delegations pointed out that a rate of 1 in 1,000 would be
unrealistic. Accordingly, some delegations supported a failure rate of 90%
and asked for a grace period of 15 years to comply with these provisions.
The discussions at the Conference underlined that the whole
concept is questionable. Self-destructing mines will be excluded from
marking and fencing requirements and can be remotely delivered in
accordance with the envisaged Convention.
The concept of
self-destruction is misleading, as it supports a general perception that
self-destructing mines are not dangerous. As this assumption is highly
doubtful, it will be reduced to absurdity if the position prevails that lowers
both the time frame and the failure rate for these mines.
V. DETECTABILITY

Equally broad differences remained concerning the question of
detectability, a provision of utmost importance to mine clearance
operations. The Rolling Text provided for two alternatives: One required
that each mine shall have a metal content equivalent to 8 grams of iron in a
single coherent mass; while the other required mines to be detectable with
commonly available equipment in a more generic way. No agreement was
reached on this provision. Some countries obstructed the inclusion of a
precise specification of a metal content, arguing that all mines are, in fact,
detectable. Other delegations agreed with such specifications but asked for
a grace period, ranging from fifteen years to indefinite. It is needless to
say that these proposals would make a provision on detectability
meaningless.
Numerous state parties want the requirement for detectability to
apply to anti-personnel mines only, arguing with the different objectives of
using anti-tank mines and pointing out that the latter do not pose dangers to
civilians, a view that was opposed by other delegations and, in particular,
by DHA and the ICRC. The question of making a distinction between
anti-personnel and anti-tank mines was brought up for all provisions
regulating the use of mines.
VI.

OTHER ISSUES REGARDING RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES

Some delegations pointed to the increasing importance of remotely
delivered mines in military operations and, as a result, to the need to allow
the use of these mines. The problem is obvious: remotely delivered mines
can neither be marked nor fenced nor accurately recorded. Though some
delegations supported a position to ban these mines on the whole, the
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majority agreed to allow the use of remotely delivered mines that are
self-destructing.
No agreement could be reached regarding a tabled proposal to ban
anti-handling devices on anti-personnel mines, features of particular
danger to mine clearance personnel. Opposing delegations argued that
these devices were necessary to protect mines against removal.
VII. TRANSFERS
Prohibiting the transfer of certain mines was already a very
contentious issue in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts and
no agreement could be reached as to whether a corresponding provision
should be included in the Convention. The Conference made only very
limited progress to reduce the differences. Opponents argued that the
question of transfers should not be part of a humanitarian law regulating
the use of certain weapons.
VIII. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Like transfers, the question of verification was one of the most
controversial issues in the preparatory meetings and at the Review
Conference.
The western group supported an extensive system by
establishing a verification commission that would investigate alleged
violations by, for example, fact finding missions. The establishment of a
verification regime was heavily opposed by other delegations, with the
result that the Conference could not even agree on principles regarding this
issue.
IX. CONCLUSION
The United Nations' position on the question of land mines was
clearly stated by the Secretary General on various occasions. A total ban
on land mines is the only effective measure to rid the world of the scourge
of these weapons. He declared at the Vienna Conference: "We must ban
land mines once and for all! We must ban their use! We must ban their
production! We must destroy those that are stockpiled!"
Although an increasing number of Governments have joined the
Secretary General's call for a total ban on land mines, the probable
outcome of the Review Conference will fall short of this aim.
Participating states' positions center too much on the military and
economic aspects of the land mine issue and do not take adequately into
account the humanitarian dimensions of the land mine crisis, which in fact
triggered this Review Conference.
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The world-wide problem of uncleared land mines has continued to
grow in the past year, with the laying of new mines outstripping the efforts
of the United Nations and other bodies to remove them. Mines have
become and will continue to be the weapon of choice in armed conflicts, as
they are cheap, easy to obtain, and effective. We have also seen a change
in the use of these weapons in the past, as land mines were employed in
large numbers and in an indiscriminate manner. We are looking at an
estimated 10,000,000 land mines in Afghanistan, 9-15,000,000 in Angola,
8-10,000,000 in Cambodia, 10,000,000 in Northern Iraq, and 2,000,000
in Mozambique to name only a few countries.
Probably 10,000 people die each year due to mine accidents and
possibly double that number are seriously maimed. But land mines not
only strike the individual with their lethal effects, they devastate whole
nations by impeding the restoration of societal life in the aftermath of
armed conflicts, possibly for decades. Hundreds of thousands of refugees
and internally displaced persons cannot return to their villages because of
land mines; agriculture cannot be revived without clearing the land of
mines; transportation becomes impossible because of mined roads and
tracks; irrigation systems and critical industries become unusable; and
medical systems are overburdened.
The United Nations' involvement in mine clearance activities
began in 1989 when it established its first mine clearance program in
Afghanistan, which is currently employing 3000 deminers. Comprehensive
mine clearance programs were also set up in Cambodia and Mozambique,
and the United Nations is currently in the process of developing its
program in Angola. There is increasing international support for these
operations which culminated in this year's International Meeting on Mine
Clearance in Geneva. But mine clearance activities in the most affected
countries are likely to continue for decades and can continue only if this
support is sustained at the highest possible level.
But, besides these critical efforts to alleviate the suffering of
affected populations, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the number
of newly laid mines exponentially outweighs the number of those that are
cleared. The magnitude of the problem makes it imperative that a political
solution is found to stop the proliferation of these insidious weapons.
There is a growing expectation that the international community takes the
necessary steps to rid the world of the scourge of land mines. The States
Parties to the CCW will have to amplify their efforts significantly if they
want to come up to those expectations. We believe that a total ban on land
mines is the only effective measure to end the indiscriminate killing and
maiming of innocent civilian personnel.

